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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
DALE J. NIELSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 88-529CA

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
GENERAL ELECTRIC and/or
ELECTRIC MUTUAL LIABILITY, and
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,

(Argument Priority No. 6)

Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS GENERAL ELECTRIC
AND ELECTRIC MUTUAL LIABILITY

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the Industrial Commission correctly concluded,

as a factual matter, that the medical panel was properly constituted and fully qualified to render a medical decision in
this case?
II.

Whether this Court should give deference to the

Industrial Commission's factual determination that Nielson's
current disability was not medically caused by any industrial
accident?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND CASE AUTHORITY
The determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77
(Supp. 1988).

The determinative case authorities are Rekward

v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d 166 (Utah App. 1988); and
Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Plaint iff/Appellant Dale Nielson ("Nielson") claims
Workers1 Compensation benefits for an osteomyelitis/discitis
condition in his back treated in June, 1983, alleging that such
condition was caused by an industrial injury to his leg which
occurred nearly fourteen months earlier on April 26, 1982. (R.
at 4.)
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the
Industrial Commission.

1.

On September 12, 1983, Nielson made application for

workers1 compensation benefits for his osteomyelitis/discitis
condition.
2.

(R. at 4.)

A hearing on Nielson's claim was conducted before

Administrative Law Judge Janet L. Moffit on December 18, 1984.
(R. at 16.)
3.

Following the Hearing, the Administrative Law Judge

referred the matter to a Medical Panel consisting of: (1) an
orthopedic surgeon; (2) a neurologist; and (3) an internist.
(R. at 114-15.)
4.

The medical panel thoroughly reviewed an "extremely

large" medical file and conducted extensive research into
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Nielson's medical background and treatment history, including
additional consideration of (1) Nielson's own expert's opinions; and (2) substantial consultations with other physicians
knowledgeable about the subject cervical spine condition at
issue.
5.

(R. at 123-124, 346, 349-351 and 352.)
The medical panel determined that there is no medi-

cally demonstrable causal connection between the problems
complained of and the industrial accident which occurred on
April 26, 1982.
6.

(R. at 366.)

On April 15, 1988, based upon her review of evidence

and the Medical Panel Report, Administrative Law Judge,
Janet L. Moffit entered her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Order, concluding that Nielson "failed to sustain his
burden of proving a causal relationship between his industrial
accident of April 26, 1982, and the medical conditions he later
developed and identified as osteomyelitis and discitis in
1983." (R. at 379.)
7.

On April 30, 1988, Nielson petitioned the Industrial

Commission of Utah ("Commission") to review the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order, contending, for the first
time, that the medical panel was not properly constituted.
(R. at 381-387.)
8.

On August 30, 1988, the Commission entered its Order

denying Nielson's Motion for Review concluding that it could
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find Mno evidence supportive of Nielson's allegations that the
medical panel in this case was not qualified to render a
decision."
9.

(R. at 410.)

Nielson petitions this Court for Review of the

Commission's Final Order.
C.

(R. at 412-15.)

Statement of Facts;

The Statement of Facts contained in Nielson's brief goes
beyond the Record and reasonable inferences which might be made
therefrom.

Therefore, respondents offer the following facts to

accurately present and clarify the Record.
1.

While working on a generator on April 26, 1982, Nielson

fell over a guard rail and sustained contusions and cuts on his
legs.

(R. at 77.) Nielson received medical treatment follow-

ing the accident.
2.

(R. at 77.)

Nielson continued working after his accident.

(R. at

103-104.)
3.

Between May 30 and June 3, 1982, Nielson was hospital-

ized for a bleeding ulcer.

(R. at 81.)

During Nielson's

hospitalization, it was discovered that one of his legs was
infected with staphylococci bacteria ("staph").
given appropriate antibiotic treatment.
376.)

Nielson was

(R. at 81-82 and

Shortly thereafter, the leg healed completely.

377. )
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(R. at

4.

On August 11, 1982, Nielson was treated for pneumonia,

a serious upper respiratory infection and inflammation, and was
again placed on antibiotics.

(R. at 109 and 377.) Nielsen was

again treated for a fairly chronic bronchitis beginning in
August, 1982 for which he was treated on various occasions with
antibiotics through December, 1982.
5.

(R. at 160-164.)

In September, 1982, Nielson again suffered medical

problems associated with rectal bleeding and gastric pain and
was hospitalized on September 21, 1982.
6.

(R. at 355 and 377.)

On December 11, 1982 Nielson had an infected ingrown

toenail excised. (R. at 355 and 377.)
7.

Nielson did not miss work until February, 1983, when

he testified he suffered pain in his right shoulder and neck.
(R. at 106.)
8.

Relevant medical records indicate that Nielson first

experienced pain in his shoulder and neck while attending a ball
game in February of 1983.
9.

(R. at 106.)

Nielson did not remember telling any of his physicians

Dr. King, Dr. Sanders or Dr. Lamb that he had suffered any pain
in his shoulder or neck for any period of time prior to February
of 1983.
10.

(R. at 106-107.)
Dr. Dean Black's medical notes indicate that Nielson's

pain "started on 2/4/83," when he attended a baseball game.
(R. at. 84 and 358.) Dr. John Sanders, a neurosurgeon, noted:
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"no prior history of injury to neck or prior arm problem and no
recent cause explained."
11.

(R. at 356.)

In February, 1983, Dr. King treated Nielson for

shoulder and low back pain and Nielson was subsequently hospitalized.

Dr. Sanders treated Nielson for the neck and shoulder

pain and performed a cervical myelogram on February 14, 1983.
(R. at 85, 356 and 377.)
12.

Nielson had a bone scan performed on February 18, 1983,

which revealed problems in the lower cervical spine.

During his

hospitalization, Nielson was also treated by Dr. Thomas Houltz
who made findings of possible disc herniation at the C5-C6 level
and C-6-C7 levels.

Nevertheless, Nielson was released from the

hospital shortly thereafter.
13.

(R. at 356 and 377.)

On or about May 13, 1983, the pain in the left side of

Nielson's neck and shoulder had increased and he was again
injected in the area and advised to take physical therapy,
which proved ineffective.
14.

(R. at 356-357 and 377.)

Nielson was referred to Dr. Satovick, a neurosurgeon

approximately fourteen months after Nielson's industrial accident.

Dr. Satovick repeated a CT scan on Nielson, which proved

unsatisfactory.

A third CT scan was performed on June 20, 1983,

where destruction in the bone in the cervical area was noted.
(R. at 31-32, 377.)
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15.

Nielson was then referred to Dr. Lamb, who admitted

Nielson to St. Mark's Hospital and performed corrective surgery
on June 27, 1983.

(R. at 33, 397.)

Dr. Lamb diagnosed

Nielson's condition as discitis/osteomyelitis.
16.

(R. at 357.)

Samples of tissue removed from the surgical site were

sent to the lab for examination.

No growth of any organisms

was found in the tissue samples and the tissue samples did not
culture.
17.

(R. at 34, 357 and 377.)
Because of the negative culture, it was impossible to

determine what particular organism was responsible for the
discitis and subsequent osteomyelitis.
18.

(R. at 34, 377.)

The medical notes of Dr. Lamb, Nielson*s treating

physician, indicate that Dr. Lamb could not relate Nielson*s
discitis and osteomyelitis to the leg injury suffered as a
result of his industrial accident of April 26, 1982.

(R. at

188, 358 and 378.)
19.

Following the June, 1983 surgery, Nielson did not

return to work but has received sickness and accident benefits
from the employer as well as long-term disability insurance
payments from a private policy and Social Security benefits.
(R. at 103 and 378.)
20.

The independent medical panel assigned to this matter

by the Administrative Law Judge consisting of an orthopedic
surgeon, an internist and a neurologist unanimously determined
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that there was no causal connection between the applicant's
discitis and osteomyelitis condition and the earlier industrial
accident.
21.

(R. at 366 and 378.)

The following factual determinations were adopted and

upheld by the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission:
(a) The three doctors of the medical panel have
treated, at least, as many discitis/osteomyelitis cases and
perhaps more than Dr. Burke and "are certainly well qualified
to voice an opinion in this matter."

(R. at 378.)

All of the

doctors who testified in this matter were well qualified and
presented reasoned opinions.

(R. at 379.)

(b) Nielson's own expert, Dr. Burke, conceded that
the medical panel was qualified to determine the medical causation issue before it and that the panel members have expertise
in infection matters which they treat on a daily basis.

(R. at

242 and 409.)
(c) Dr. Burke did not review the transcript and only
spent approximately four hours in analysis.

(R. at 378.)

Dr. Burke did not have all the medical information before him
as did the independent medical panel.

(R. at 409.)

(d) The medical panel chairman consulted with
Dr. Burke in order to fully consider his opinions.

The panel

members, after consulting, determined to maintain their findings of no medical causation.

(R. at 378.)
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(e) The medical panel was unbiased, whereas Dr. Burke
had treated Nielson and may therefore be biased in his favor.
(R. at 409.)
(f) Dr. Burke admitted that bacteria can be in the
blood stream normally without having been introduced through a
wound or illness, and that sources of infection other than the
staph in Nielson's leg could have caused Nielson's present
condition.

(R. at 378 and 409.)

(g) There was nothing more than a possibility that
Nielson's condition of osteomyelitis/discitis arose from a
staph infection and Dr. Burke admitted that causation cannot be
proven.

(R. at 130 and 379.)

(h) The medical panel conferred with outside physicians
considered to be experts in the relevant fields of medicine,
including an expert in infectious disease, all of whom uniformly agreed with the medical panel conclusion that there was
no connection between Nielsen's industrial accident and the
subsequent development of osteomyelitis/discitis.

(R. at

377-379 and 409.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Substantial evidence supports the factual conclusion of the
Administrative Law Judge and Commission that the medical panel
in the instant case was "well qualified to voice an opinion in
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this matter."

(R. at 378.)

For this reason, the Commission was

fully justified, after reviewing all the evidence, in adopting
the findings of the medical panel rather than those of independent physicians.
Nielson has failed to sustain his burden of proving that
the medical panel was unqualified or that further physician
specialization was required under Utah law.

In addition, sub-

stantial evidence supports the Commission conclusion that there
was no connection between the accident which occurred in April
1982 and the osteomyelitis/discitis which was found in Nielson's
cervical spine some fourteen months later.
When there are differing medical opinions presented in the
record, as in the instant case, the Commission is not bound to
accept the opinion of any particular witness, but has the prerogative to "view the entire testimony of the medical panel
doctor(s) and believe those statements that impress it."
Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986).

See also

Rekward v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d 166, 167-69 (Utah
App. 1988).
By this appeal, Nielson attempts to discredit the opinion
of the medical panel in the instant case, based upon his mere
assertions that the independent medical panel was improperly
constituted and that Dr. Burke was somehow better qualified than
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the panel to make a medical judgment.

However, Nielson's asser-

tions have neither legal support nor factual merit.

On the

contrary, the Record abundantly supports the conclusions of both
the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission that Dr. Burke's
opinion is only speculation and that there is no evidence that
the medical panel was not fully qualified to render a medical
opinion in this case.

For these reasons, the Order of the

Commission must be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS SHOULD
NOT BE DISPLACED.
The Utah Supreme Court explained the appropriate standard of
review for Industrial Commission cases in Blaine v. Industrial
Commission, 700 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1985), concluding that
"the Commission's findings are not to be displaced in the
absence of a showing that they are arbitrary and capricious."
The Court clarified this standard of review in Rushton v. Gelco
Express, 732 P.2d at 109 (Utah 1986), explaining that the findings and orders of the Commission are not arbitrary and capricious unless "they are contrary to the evidence or without any
reasonable basis in the evidence."
In Blaine, the Utah Supreme Court referred to the prior case
of Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1982), in

-11-

order to outline the Appellate Court's function in reviewing
Industrial Commission findings:
[I]t is apparent that this Court's function in reviewing Commission findings of fact is a strictly
limited one in which the question is not whether the
Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether
they are supported by a preponderance of evidence.
Instead, the reviewing Court's inquiry is whether the
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious,"
or "wholly without cause," or contrary to the "one
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence," or without
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then
should the Commission's findings be displaced. (Citations omitted.)
Kaiser Steel, 732 P.2d at 890.

See also Lancaster v. Gilbert

Development, 736 P.2d 237, 238 (Utah 1987).
Accordingly, this Court "give[s] maximum deference to the
basic facts determined by the agency, which will be sustained
if there is evidence of any substance that can be reasonably
regarded as supporting the determination made."

Wilson v.

Industrial Commission, 735 P.2d 403, 403 (Utah App. 1987)
(citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial Commission, 732 P.2d
508-509 (Utah 1987)).

In the instant case, the Commission and

the Administrative Law Judge have both determined, as a factual
matter, that the independent medical panel was not only
properly constituted, but also "well qualified to voice an
opinion in this matter."

(R. at 378 and 409-410.)

Substantial

evidence supports this determination and the findings of the
panel, as set forth in detail below.
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POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE MEDICAL PANEL WAS QUALIFIED TO
RENDER A MEDICAL DECISION IN THIS CASE.
A.

The Medical Panel Was Properly Constituted.

Nielson urges this Court to overturn the Order of the Commission based upon the argument that the medical panel lacked
"requisite expertise."

(Nielson's Brief at p. 7.)

Nielson also

contends that the opinions of his expert should have been considered and adopted to validate the medical panel.

Nielson's

arguments are both legally flawed and factually unsupported
because: (1) The Commission selected qualified physicians to
fill the panel; and (2) The Commission need not adopt the
opinions of independent physicians.
In Rushton v. Gelco Express, 739 P.2d 109, 110 (Utah 1986),
the Utah Supreme Court held that "the Commission is not necessarily bound to accept the opinions of any witness or witnesses,
expert or otherwise."

In Rushton, the plaintiff argued that

the findings of the Commission were arbitrary and capricious
because the Administrative Law Judge adopted the findings of the
medical panel rather than those of plaintiff's treating physician.

According to the plaintiff in Rushton, the Administrative

Law Judge should have been required as a matter of law to give
deference to the treating physician's findings.

The Utah

Supreme Court refused to adopt plaintiff's argument:
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Decisions from this Court have repeatedly affirmed the
fact-finding role of the Commission and have stated
that the Commission must look at all relevant evidence
in reaching its findings without being restricted to
giving evidence from a specific witness more weight
than that from other witnesses . . . the Commission is
the principal fact-finder and as such may review all
relevant evidence.
Rushton, 732 P.2d at 110-111.
Likewise, in Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d
237, 238 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that where
there is competent and comprehensive medical evidence in the
record upon which the Administrative Law Judge could rely he or
she must make the factual determination: "although the medical
evidence was conflicting, it is the responsibility of the
Administrative Law Judge to resolve factual conflicts."
(Emphasis added).
Therefore, in deciding conflicting medical evidentiary
issues, the Commission need not accept the opinions of any
specific witness or witnesses.

Shipley v. C&W Contracting Co.,

528 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1974).

Rather, the Commission has both

the "prerogative and the duty to view the entire testimony of
the medical panel doctor[s] and believe those statements that
impress it."

Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109, 110 (Utah

1986), (citing Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235,
240, 398 P.2d 882, 885 (1965).

After such review, the fact

that the Commission adopts "the findings of the panel rather
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than those of the independent physicians does not render the
Commission's finding arbitrary and capricious."

Rekward, 755

P.2d at 168.
In the instant case, Nielson, like the plaintiff in Rushton,
attempts to improperly restrict the fact-finding role of the
Commission by imposing his subjective standard of what constitutes a valid medical panel upon the Commission and this
Court.

Thus, Nielson, in essence, asks this Court to oversee

the Commission's selection of medical panel specialists any
time the applicant is dissatisfied with Commission's choices or
the independent medical panel's opinion.

If this Court were to

adopt the position advocated by Nielson, it would unduly narrow
the evidence the Commission could rely upon and could increase
the potential for bias in proceedings before the Commission.
Nielson's position would also force improper judicial activism
in an area properly overseen by the Commission.
Rather than adopt Nielson's untenable position, respondents
respectfully submit that the only issue for decision in the
instant case is whether the Commission properly determined, as
a factual matter, that the medical doctors constituting the
panel were sufficiently qualified to render an opinion in this
case.
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Nielson's claim that the medical panel must include a
doctor who is board certified in infectious diseases is not
supported by the Record.

Dr. Hess, the medical panel chairman,

testified that he did not see a need for it (R. at 154.) and
even Dr. Burke noted that the members of the medical panel have
expertise in infectious diseases and in fact deal with them on
a daily basis in treatment of patients.

(R. at 242). Dr. Hess

is a board certified orthopedic surgeon and, as such, has
specifically dealt with and treated osteomyelitis/discitis on
numerous occasions (R. at 154). In fact, he has addressed the
particular ailment suffered by Nielson in greater depth and
frequency than has Dr. Burke.

Id.

All of the members of the

medical panel, as well as additional medical experts with whom
the panel consulted, appear by the Record to have not only
sufficient training, expertise and experience to have properly
addressed the medical issue presented in this case but are also
probably more qualified than Dr. Burke (R. at 139 and 201).
Dr. Burke is not an orthopedic specialist, and Applicant's
medical problem is specifically orthopedic in nature (R. at
237).
Dr. Burke admitted that orthopedics is one of the oldest
medical specialties in existence while his own specialty of
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infectious diseases is fairly new (R. at 208). He even conceded:

"Infectious diseases is a relatively new, young spe-

cialty/' and "I feel that I am a student of infectious disease
more than an expert in infectious disease."

(Id.)

He admitted

that the principal focus of his own training and practice has
been infections of the urinary tract (R. at 238) and that he
has never specifically studied or written on the subject of
orthopedic problems as related to infectious diseases (R. at
238).

Moreover, his emphasis has been academic rather than

private practice treatment.

(R. at 209.)

Based on this and other substantial evidence, the
Administrative Law Judge concluded, as a factual matter, that:
The three doctors of the medical panel have
treated, at least, as many cases and perhaps more than
[Nielson's expert] Dr. Burke and are certainly well
qualified to voice an opinion in this matter.
In trying to determine which viewpoint to adopt,
the Administrative Law Judge notes that all of the
doctors who testified in this matter were well qualified and presented reasoned opinions. However, the
Administrative Law Judge, after a careful review of
the transcripts, is of the opinion that the report of
the medical panel should be adopted in this matter.
(R. at 378-379.)
The Commission also concluded that the medical panel was
properly constituted and fully qualified in the instant case:
The Commission finds that the only issue on
review is whether the Administrative Law Judge correctly adopted the medical panel report in this case.
The Commission finds that on close questions of medical
causation it is proper to defer to the finding of the
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medical panel as the panels are setup specifically to
resolve on an unbiased basis medical controversies
arising in connection with industrial injuries. The
Commission finds no specific evidence supportive of
the applicant's allegations that the medical panel is
not qualified to render a decision in this case. That
being the only relevant objection made by counsel for
the applicant, the Commission must deny the applicant's Motion for Review and affirm the Administrative
Law Judge. (Emphasis added.)
(R. at 410.)
Under these circumstances, Respondents respectfully urge
this Court to uphold the factual determinations of the
Commission by appropriately "giv[ing] maximum deference to the
basic facts determined by the agency, which will be sustained
if there is evidence of any substance that can be reasonably
regarded as supporting the determination made."

Wilson v.

Industrial Commission, 375 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1987)
(citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial Commission, 732 P.2d 508,
508-09 (Utah 1987)).
B.

Utah Legal Requirements for Medical Panel Members Were
Satisfied in the Instant Case.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 provides in pertinent part that:
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury
by accident, or for death, arising out of or in the
course of employment, and if the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel
appointed by the commission. The panel shall have the
qualifications generally applicable to the medical
panel under Section 35-2-56. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-56 states that:
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Where a claim for compensation based upon partial permanent disability due to an occupational disease or
industrial injury is filed with the commission, the
commission shall appoint an impartial medical panel to
consist of one or more physicians specializing in the
treatment of the disease or condition involved in the
claim • . • .
In the instant case, Nielson contends that his subjective
desire that the medical panel have a broad certified infectious
disease specialist must be satisfied to comply with Utah law.
However, the statute, at most, provides for a panel consisting
of physicians "specializing in the treatment" of the condition
involved in the claim.

This statutory obligation has been

fully satisfied in the instant case.
First, the condition suffered by Nielson was not treated by
an infectious disease expert but by physicians specializing in
fields of specialty represented by the medical panel members.
Second, the physicians on the panel and others who were consulted had more than sufficient expertise to decide the medical
issues in this case as it related to either orthopedics or
infection.

(R. at 139, 201 and 242.)

Point II supra.

See also Argument at

Finally, the percentage of probability and

causation argument urged by Nielson is unsupported and
speculative.
Nielson asserts that there was a "90 percent probability
that the infection in the spine resulted from the industrial
accident leg laceration.

(Nielson Brief at pp. 11 and 16.)

Nielson also contends that other sources of infection are "far
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fetched" because "no culture or other medically demonstrable
evidence was found that such an infection even existed."

Id.

at p. 15. These assertions are either completely unreliable or
contradictory.
The statement regarding a 90 percent probability was not
any expression of medical certainty, but rather constitutes the
mere belief of Dr. Burke, who acknowledges that a nexis between
Nielson's accident and his present condition cannot be proven.
(R. at 228 and 130.)

Second, Dr. Burke's belief of a second

incident of staph infection is based upon pure speculation
because there was no culture of staph infection from the
cervical spine operation.

(R. at 34 and 377.)

Accordingly, Dr. Burke's testimony regarding two incidents
of staph infection is not factual, but based upon his own
belief or speculation.

There is no evidence that a staph

infection even existed in the Nielson's cervical spine area.
Thus, there is absolutely no evidence of connection between the
leg wound and cervical spine damage in this case, and by
Nielson's own logic, Dr. Burke's testimony is nothing but "far
fetched."
In reviewing Nielson's osteomyelitis/discitis condition and
related claims for disability benefits, the medical panel noted
that numerous physicians agreed with the panel determination
that there is no medically demonstrable causal connection

-20-

between the problems presently complained of and Nielson's
earlier industrial accident which occurred on April 26, 1982.
(R. at 366-368.)
The Administrative Law Judge in determining which viewpoint
to adopt, noted that all of the doctors who testified in this
matter were well qualified and presented reasoned opinions.
(R. at 379.) After careful review of the transcripts, the
Administrative Law Judge concluded as a factual matter that
"there is nothing but a possibility that the osteomyelitis
arose from a staph infection."

(R. at 379.)

Under circumstances in which there is only a "possibility
of medical causation, as in the instant case, the Utah Supreme
Court has forcefully stated:
[W]e agree with plaintiff's urgence that a finding of
fact and the imposition of liability cannot properly be
made on a mere possibility, but that can be done only
if there is a basis upon which reasonable minds acting
fairly thereon could conclude that the greater probability of truth lies therein. Further, that in so discharging its responsibility it was the prerogative and
the duty of the Commission to consider not only the
report of the medical panel, but also all of the other
evidence and to draw whatever inferences and deductions
fairly and reasonably could be derived therefrom.
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978).
Based on the foregoing and other medical evidence, the
Administrative Law Judge made the following factual finding
with respect to medical causation in this case:
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It is difficult to state that the leg wound some nine
and a half months prior to the development of the
actual disc problem is the most probable source,
although possible. It is entirely too speculative to
assign all of this gentleman's problem to the laceration resulting from the accident in April of 1982.
It becomes a matter of possible cause versus probable
cause. The proximity of the other sources of infection were much closer to the onset of the applicant's
actual symptoms. Although not cultured, it was
pointed out that the osteomyelitis can develop not
only from staph infections but from other types of
infection as well.
(R. at 379.)
Administrative Law Judge, Janet Moffet also determined that
because the medical panel had been fully apprised of the medical
information relating to Nielson's claims and his expert witness,
Dr. Burke, this case involves the classic situation where reasonable minds can and do differ.

Judge Moffet carefully consi-

dered the evidence and opinions offered by Dr. Burke, particularly his letter, dated February 6, 1986.

Which specifically

states that:
I am in full agreement with all of the statements by
Dr. Bohlman except for his conclusions that there is
not a causal relation between the injury and the cervical osteomyelitis in this case. . . . While I agree
with him that there is no way one can prove a connection that long after the injury," I firmly believe
that the evidence strongly supports such a connection.
(Emphasis added.)
(R. at 130.) From these statements, Judge Moffet found that
even Dr. Burke felt that Nielson's disability could not be
proven to have resulted from his previous industrial accident
of April 26, 1982.

(R. at 379.)
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Although Dr. Burke speculated that "the occurrence of two
staphylococcal infections in a patient in the same year itself
speaks for a very direct connection in the prospective of our
current understanding of staphylococcal disease."

Dr. Burke

acknowledged that other infections may have been responsible
for the osteomyelitis/discitis condition and that there is no
way to prove such connection.

Because the Commission's find-

ings of fact cannot be based on mere speculation (IGA Food Fair
v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978)), and the medical panel
clearly concluded that no additional industrial disability had
occurred, Judge Moffet properly determined that:
The applicant in this matter, Dale Nielson, has failed
to sustain his burden in proving a causal relationship
between his industrial accident of April 26, 1982, and
the injuries he sustained at that time and the development of the osteomyelitis in the spring of 1983.
(R. a 379.)
In contrast to the speculative opinions of Dr. Burke, the
medical panel unequivocally stated there is no medically
demonstrable causal connection between the problems complained
of and the industrial accident of April 26, 1982 and all of the
residual problems complained of by the applicant were caused by
pre-existing conditions or post-existing conditions.

(R. at

366.)
In essence, Nielson simply argues each of the separate
factors which he covered on cross-examination of the medical
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panel chairman and asserts that his own analysis makes the
causal connection between the accident and the cervical infection the "most possible" of several possibilities.

However,

this does not give rise to a "probability" and mere possibilities cannot support a finding of causation.

IGA Food Fair,

584 P.2d at 830.
Because of the limited and speculative nature of Dr. Burke's
testimony and the direct position taken by numerous qualified
medical experts, the Commission's decision, that any current
disability suffered by Nielson did not result from the industrial accident, is supported by substantial evidence and
further satisfies the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-56.
POINT III
THE COMMISSION'S FINAL ORDER IS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
A.

The Record Amply Supports The Industrial Commission's
Findings and Order.

The thrust of Nielson's appeal is an attempt to impose a
requirement upon this Court to oversee the selection and
appointment of discretionary medical panels by the Commission.
In other words, Nielson wants a "second bite out of the apple,"
despite the fact that there was a proper review of this matter
by the full Commission which determined that (1) the medical
panel was properly constituted and possessed requisite expertise necessary to properly consider medical issues in the
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instant case; (2) the medical evidence relied upon by the
medical panel and the reasoning behind the medical panel's
factual findings provide substantial support for the conclusion
that Nielson's present ailments are not causally related to any
industrial accident; and (3) the Record fully supports the decision of the Commission to uphold the findings of the medical
panel and Administrative Law Judge.

(R. at 408-410.)

Although Nielson suffered an industrial accident in April,
1982, the evidence amply demonstrates that his present discitus/
osteomyelitis disability is not a result of such accident.
Nielson contends that the Commission erred by not appointing a
medical panel with a board certified specialist in infectious
disease to determine medical causation and then urges that his
own expert's testimony is most reliable because of expertise in
that field.
This contention is, at best, contradictory because Nielson
initially offered the testimony of Dr. Robert M. Satovick, a
neurologist, to prove his medical causation theory.

It was only

after the medical panel, including a neurologist, Dr. Gerald
Moress, concluded that there was no causal relationship between
Nielson's industrial accident in 1982 and the discitis/
osteomyelitis discovered in 1983 that Nielson decided an infectious disease expert was necessary to properly constitute the
panel.

(R. at 408-410.)
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Nielson's contradiction is exacerbated by offering testimony
of the neurologist, Dr. Satovick, where helpful, to support his
factual contentions on appeal, even though Nielson offers his
unsupported contention that the panel's neurologist, Dr. Moress,
allegedly does not have sufficient expertise to render a medical decision in this case.

(Nielson Brief at pp. 7-18.)

In addition to the contradictions in Nielson's argument,
the facts demonstrate that the medical panel was substantially
better informed than Dr. Burke with respect to the medical
issues involved in Nielson's case.

(R. at 378-379.)

Dr. Hess

reviewed the entire Commission Record, including all medical
records and transcript of hearing before the Commission.
Dr. Hess spent approximately seven and a half hours reviewing
the Record and spent additional time preparing an extensive
abstract of the contents of that Record.

Dr. Hess also spent

time consulting other specialists on the subject medical
issues.

By contrast, Dr. Burke admitted that his entire

understanding of the case came from a review of the medical
panel report and the letter of Dr. Harry Bohlman to Dr. Hess
dated September 4, 1985.

(R. at 272-273.)

Dr. Burke admitted

that he had not reviewed the transcript of hearing (R. at 239)
and that he had not obtained and reviewed the medical records,
which were substantial (R. at 240 and 246).

Indeed Dr. Burke's

preparation of an opinion was described as spending about an
hour in reviewing his files, an hour of reviewing literature,
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and a couple of hours reviewing the medical panel report and
formulating his thoughts about the case (R. at 240). Dr. Burke
also admitted that he had not consulted with any other doctor
concerning this case except to talk to Dr. Hess on the telephone (R. at 240). Dr. Burke did not talk to either Dr. Moress
or Dr. Bench, the other members of the medical panel, nor did
he consult with Dr. Bohlman, Dr. Eismont or Dr. Dunn, who provided input into the analysis of the medical panel.

Surpris-

ingly Nielson contends that the Panel lacked sufficient expertise to make a determination in this case, yet Nielson's expert
relied upon the panel's medical summary as his principal source
of information to form an opinion.

(R. at 240.) Moreover,

Nielson fails to even address the qualifications of two panel
members.
On the other hand, the medical panel not only reviewed the
entire record in depth and consulted with each other on several
occasions, but the panel diligently pursued input from experts
who had specifically studied and written about the medical
issues presented in Nielson's case.

Dr. Hess wrote to and

received replies from Drs. Eismont and Bohlman who had prepared
case studies on the medical problems presented herein.
123-124, 346, 349-350 and 351.)

(R. at

Dr. Hess also sent the record

in this case to Dr. Harold K. Dunn whom he characterized as one
of the finest spine surgeons in the world (R. at 192) for
Dr. Dunn's independent input.

It is also significant that the
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medical panel had the benefit of Dr. Burke's contrary opinion
and analysis (R. at 193). Thus, in a real sense, the medical
panel had the benefit of consultation with a "board certified"
doctor in infectious diseases in connection with its study.
Thus, the medical panel was not only fully informed of the facts
of this case but it had the benefit of the expertise, not only
of its own panel members but also that of a variety of other
doctors with diverse backgrounds, experience and specialties,
including infectious disease.
It should also not go unnoticed that the medical panel was
totally independent, unbiased and objective (R. at 200). Its
members were selected by the Administrative Law Judge, not one
of the parties to this action, and the panel has considerable
experience in dealing with medical panel issues.
Dr. Burke is not independent.

By contrast,

His original involvement was a

meeting with Nielson's attorney (R. at 235), and he was hired
to testify on behalf of Nielson and was paid by him for that
purpose (R. at 237). Nielson complains concerning the substantial investment which he had to make in expert witness fees in
order to produce the medical testimony which is contrary to that
of the medical panel.

(Nielson Brief at 17.)

This contention

only serves to emphasize the non-objectivity of Nielson's own
medical evidence.
Significantly, Nielson has failed to prove that all panel
members, as a whole, lacked the requisite expertise demanded by
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the statute.

This Court should not engage in pre-judging what

specific expertise is necessary to render the medical opinion
assistance which the Industrial Commission seeks by use of the
discretionary medical panel.

Such judgment should be left up

to the Industrial Commission who deals with these matters on a
routine basis.

To reverse this case would place the Court of

Appeals in a position of second-guessing the Commission with
respect to the medical qualifications of each doctor on each
specific type of case for each medical issue.
In summary, the factual determination of the independent
medical panel relative to causation was the ultimate whole
opinion of the medical panel members.

Nielson attempts in his

analysis of the medical evidence to separate out individual
items and force an acceptance by this Court of each separate
factor rather than to allow reliance by this Court and the
Administrative Law Judge on the final conclusion based upon all
of the evidence.

Such contentions and their practical conse-

quences are clearly not countenanced by the body of legal
authority mandating judicial deference to the decisions of the
agency responsible for managing workers' compensation issues.
See Rushton v. Galeo Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986).
B.

The Industrial Commission Properly Concluded that
Nielson's Current Disability Did Not Result from Any
Industrial Accident.

It is evident that the medical panel based its opinion on a
far more sound analysis than did Nielson's expert witness,
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Dr. Burke.

The particular type of infection which invaded

Nielson's vertebrae and disc could not be identified since postsurgical cultures were negative.

(R. at 357.)

It is likewise

clear that Nielson suffered from and had been treated for
various other infections in the latter months of 1982.

(R. at

357.) The infections were other possible sources of the infection which could have migrated to Nielson's spine (R. at
160-164.)
Nielson had a fairly chronic bronchitis beginning in
August, 1982 for which he was treated on various occasions with
antibiotics through the month of December.

Id.

In addition,

Applicant suffered from an infected toe in September, 1982.
Id.

He also had gastrointestinal problems which could have

involved an infectious disease process.

_Id.

It was noted by

Dr. Hess that all of these later infections were in closer
proximity to the onset of pain in Nielson's neck which did not
commence until 10 months after the industrial accident (R. at
195).

Dr. Hess testified and Dr. Burke conceded, that the time

lapse between the onset of symptoms which reflect an invasion
of the disease process to the vertebrae and disc area in the
spine and the ability to detect such condition by way of x-ray,
etc., is only a matter of about three weeks (R. at 166-168, and
219).

Thus it is reasonable, as concluded by the medical

panel, that the source of infection which ultimately resulted
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in Nielson1s osteomyelitis/discitis would more likely be some
infectious ailment experienced by Nielson in late 1982, not the
industrial accident which Applicant sustained in April 1982,
more than 10 months before the onset of any symptoms and
approximately 14 months prior to the diagnosis of his condition.

By contrast, Dr. Burke attempted to discount and there-

fore ignore the other possible sources of infection.

Moreover,

he appeared to totally ignore the fact that Nielson had been
placed on antibiotic medication during 1982 which would have
eliminated latent sources of infection which may have come from
the industrial accident.
Importantly, Dr. Burke testified that in his opinion the
osteomyelitis found in Nielson's cervical spine was the result
of a blood-born infection (R. at 210). He then went on to
explain that "blood born infections are not common in disc
spaces" (R. at 212). Dr. Burke then revealed that infectious
organisms are commonly present in the blood of healthy individuals (R. at 213). These facts compel one to conclude that
an attempt to formulate a causal connection between Applicant's
osteomyelitis/discitis and the industrial accident is highly
speculative.
Dr. Burke conceded that apparently the source of infection
could well have been that which was carried in the blood of
Applicant as a normal healthy individual, in addition to those
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generated by the known infections suffered by Nielson between
the time he suffered an industrial accident and the condition
of which Nielson now complains.

Even based upon the reasoning

provided by Dr. Burke, one must conclude that his opinions were
not based upon reasonable medical probability.

In fact, in his

letter to Nielson's attorney, Dr. Burke agreed with Dr. Bohlman
that there is no way one can "prove a connection" between the
accident and the disc infection that long after the injury.
(R. at 130, 349-350.)

Accordingly, the Commission upheld the

Administrative Law Judge's factual determination that the source
of infection resulting in Nielson's osteomyelitis/discitis
simply cannot be determined to be causally related to the industrial accident:
[T]here were certainly other notable possible sources
of infection. There is nothing but a possibility that
the osteomyelitis arose from a staph infection. In
addition, any of the infections which arose subsequent
to the accident (although not cultured), could have
contained staph as well.
Finally, the overwhelming weight of medical opinion contained in the Record in this case favors the position taken by
the medical panel which was adopted by the Administrative Law
Judge and the Commission.

The medical panel determination was

not only the unanimous decision of Drs. Hess, Moress, and Bench
(R. at 183) but it was also the opinion of Drs. Eismont and
Bohlman to whom Dr. Hess had referred this matter for comment
and it was also specifically confirmed by the opinion of
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Dr. Dunn to whom the medical panel had referred its file for
complete review.

(R. at 123-124, 346, 349-351.)

It is also

instructive to note that Dr. Robert Lamb, the orthopedic surgeon
who performed Nielson's surgery in June of 1983 concluded that
he could not relate Nielson's difficulties to his job (R. at
188).

Thus, six independent doctors plus Nielson's treating

physician, Dr. Lamb, all support the factual determination made
by the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission.
Nielson cannot claim that he has not been given every opportunity to address the medical issues in this case fully and
without prejudice.

In fact, the medical expertise afforded to

Nielson through the appointment and activities of the medical
panel are overwhelming in comparison to other cases.

In this

case the Administrative Law Judge appointed three panel members,
rather than just one.

The three panel members alleged to lack

sufficient expertise possessed treatment expertise in orthopedics, neurology and internal medicine, and all three are
shown by the Record to have expertise in infectious disease as
related to Nielson's particular type of problem,
with which Dr. Burke agrees.

a conclusion

(R. at 242, and 408-410.)

Nielson suggests that he was not given an opportunity to
cross-examine panel members other than Dr. Hess.
Brief at 17-18).

(Nielson's

As the record amply demonstrates, all three

panel members attended the hearing on Nielson's Objections to
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the Medical Panel Report.

(R. at 149.) However, Nielson chose

not to cross-examine either Dr. Moress or Dr. Bench.

Nielson

can hardly call in question their expertise under these
circumstances.
There is no evidence contained in the Record of this case
which would even remotely demonstrate that the Administrative
Law Judge acted capriciously, arbitrarily or in excess of her
powers as claimed by Nielson.

Equally unsubstantiated is

Nielson's contention that the Administrative Law Judge's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are unsupported by evidence.

The evidence supporting the Administrative Law Judge's

Findings and Conclusions is well documented in the medical
panel report, the supporting letters of Drs. Eismont, Bohlman,
and Dunn; the opinion of the treating physician, Dr. Lamb; and
the testimony provided by Dr. Hess at the Commission's hearing
on Nielson's objections to the Medical Panel Report.

Likewise,

the bold assertion by Nielson that the judge's delay in decision
somehow caused the judge to improperly analyze the evidence is
wholly without foundation.

If anything, the Record demonstrates

that the Administrative Law Judge was extremely magnanimous
toward Nielson in that her decision was based upon a long,
thoughtful and meticulous analysis of the evidence.

Moreover,

she chose a medical panel who is not only independent but has
broad expertise and experience relating to the particular
medical questions to be addressed.
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CONCLUSION
The Record demonstrates that the overwhelming weight of
evidence supports the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
of the Administrative Law Judge and the Final Order of the
Commission on the essential issues in this case.

It is

unnecessary and contrary to the applicable standard of review
for this court to attempt to second-guess the judgment of the
Administrative Law Judge, the Medical Panel and the full
Commission on the factual issues which only involve the weight
of the evidence herein.

This is especially true where the

weight of the evidence clearly favors the determination made in
favor of Respondents.

Based on the foregoing, Respondents

respectfully request that this Court affirm the determination
of the Industrial Commission, denying Nielson's Motion for
Review.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 1989.
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